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Highlights 
 
 We combine household survey data and top income data from tax records to analyse 
the global income rich from 1988 to 2012. 
 The advanced economies accounted for 85%-88% of the global top 1% over 1988-
2005, falling to 77% in 2012. 
 There was a salient decline in global inequality from 2005 to 2012. 
 Global wealth data and attendees at the World Economic Forum also show rising 
participation of non-rich countries in the global elite. 
 Senior executives in emerging economies are typically in or close to the global top 
1%. 
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Abstract   
This paper presents the first in-depth analysis of the changing composition of the global 
income rich and the rising representation of developing countries at the top of the global 
distribution. We construct global distributions of income between 1988 and 2012 based on 
both household surveys and the new top incomes data derived from tax records, which 
capture the rich who are typically excluded from household surveys. We find that the 
representation of developing countries in the global top 1% declined until about 2002, but 
that since 2005 it has risen significantly. This coincides with a salient decline in global 
inequality since 2005, according to a range of measures. We compare our estimates of the 
country-composition and income levels of the global rich with a number of other sources – 
including Credit Suisse’s estimates of global wealth, the Forbes World Billionaires List, 
attendees of the World Economic Forum, and estimates of top executives’ salaries. To 
varying degrees, all show a rise in the representation of the developing world in the ranks of 
the global elite.  
 
 
JEL Codes: D31, D63, O57 
Keywords: top incomes, global top 1 percent, global inequality, extreme wealth   
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1. Introduction   
 
The growth of many low- and middle-income countries over the last three decades – among 
them the so-called ‘emerging economies’ – have transformed both the shape of the global 
economy and the structures of global power. Growth in the incomes of the poor has implied 
substantial reductions in poverty, and the composition of the global ‘middle class’ (defined in 
various ways) has shifted towards developing countries (Cruz et al. 2015; Kharas 2010; 
AfDB 2011; Dayton-Johnson 2015; Jayadev et al. 2015). Yet while we have information on 
global poverty and the broader global income distribution, the top of the global distribution of 
income has so far remained unexamined, not least because “it can be very challenging 
identifying all but the highest profile of the super-rich” (Hay and Muller 2012: 83). This 
paper aims to remedy that omission by using the new top incomes data along with global 
household surveys to analyse the composition and progress of the richest 1% globally, 
comparing them with the global top 10% and top 0.1%.   
 
The wealth, as opposed to the income, of the very rich is tracked by several organizations 
including Forbes and Credit Suisse. Freund and Oliver (2016) find that Forbes’s World 
Billionaire’s list contained no Chinese billionaires in 1996, 2 in 2005 and 64 in 2010. The 
latest list for 2016 contains 251 Chinese, or 14%, of the world’s 1,810 billionaires – with 
35% from outside the advanced economies more generally.2 Research by the bank Credit 
Suisse covering the period 2000–2015 finds that the wealthiest 1% in the world owned 49% 
of global wealth in 2000, dropping to a trough of 44% in 2009, and then rising for the first 
time to 50% in 2015 (Davies et al. 2015: 99; Oxfam 2015: 2). The international NGO Oxfam 
                                               
2 http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/. ‘Advanced economies’ is the IMF classification that we use below. 
See Appendix 2.   
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(2016) refers to this as an “escalating inequality crisis”, and also find that “Eight men now 
own the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of the world” (Oxfam 2017: 2).  
 
Some of the global rich themselves have expressed concern about inequality. At the 2012 
World Economic Forum meeting at Davos, “severe income disparity” was judged to be the 
single most likely global risk, and with one of the highest potential impacts.3 Again at Davos 
in 2013, Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, stated 
that “[e]xcessive inequality is corrosive to growth; it is corrosive to society. I believe that the 
economics profession and the policy community have downplayed inequality for too long” 
(Lagarde 2013).   
 
This neglect of inequality by most of the economics profession may be undergoing a 
correction with the rise in research on the incomes of the top 1% within countries (Atkinson 
and Piketty 2007, 2010; Piketty 2014). This literature focuses on estimating income shares of 
the top 1% within countries on the basis of tax records. Yet research on the global income-
rich remains sparse. Milanovic (2011, 2016) gives brief sketches of the global top 1% based 
on household surveys from around the world. But the new research on the top 1% within 
countries indicates that household surveys are bad at capturing precisely the richest 
individuals, making such surveys a limited basis for analysis of the top of the income 
distribution.4   
 
                                               
3 World Economic Forum (2012), reported by Tett (2012).   
4 Milanovic (2016: 121) acknowledges an “inability to estimate accurately the highest incomes” on the basis of 
household incomes.   
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The World Top Incomes Database (WTID) contains data on top income shares for countries 
estimated from income tax records.5 In our earlier paper (Anand and Segal 2015) we 
combined these newly-available income tax data with household survey data to provide 
estimates of global inequality up to 2005. As one would expect, global inequality so 
estimated is higher than when it is measured using household surveys alone. Here we follow 
a similar procedure as before to construct a global income distribution using both tax and 
survey data. Building on our earlier dataset, we improve our procedure for imputing top 1% 
shares, we add an additional benchmark year of 2012, use the 2011 PPPs, and for each 
country-year we smooth the top 10% using a Pareto distribution, where the Pareto coefficient 
is estimated using both tax and survey data. This allows a much finer-grained analysis of the 
top of the global distribution, at the same time as taking into account the data on the top 1% 
within countries. We also consider the distribution using market exchange rates, for 
comparison. 
 
We use this global income distribution to estimate the progress of the global top 10%, top 1% 
and top 0.1%. We focus in detail on the top 1% to determine their country composition, and 
how this has changed over time. One reason to study these global top income groups is 
simply to discover the extent to which citizens of developing countries have succeeded in 
entering the ranks of the global rich. But the global rich are also worth studying as a group, 
because the global top 1%, and even more so the global top 0.1%, share more than simply an 
income bracket.  
 
                                               
5 In January 2017 the WTID was superseded by the World Wealth and Income Database (http://wid.world/). 
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The global rich, unlike the global ‘middle class’ or the global poor, have some claim to being 
a ‘class’ in a substantive sense. They meet and interact with each other across national 
boundaries. They travel for pleasure and, as a foundation of modern globalization, officials 
and business people meet to make deals, to trade, and to work. For instance, Beaverstock 
(2002: 525) argues that “expatriates are major agents in the accumulation and transfer of 
ﬁnancial knowledge in the IFC [international financial centres], and that such processes are 
undertaken through expatriate global–local knowledge networks and other social practices”. 
The international business meeting par excellence is the above-mentioned World Economic 
Forum at Davos, and we show that the composition of nationalities of those attending the 
meeting indicates a modest increase in the internationalization of the global elite, with a 
rising share coming from outside the advanced economies.   
 
Moreover, increasingly the global rich from non-rich countries buy property abroad – 
Chinese buyers alone spent more than US$52bn on foreign property in 20156 – and study in 
rich countries, acquiring qualifications, a shared language (typically English) and, it seems 
likely, some degree of shared culture and attitudes. The British Council (2012: 15-17) reports 
that 3.5 million students studied abroad in 2009, up from 800,000 in the mid-1970s, and that 
the countries with the highest net outflows of students were China, India, South Korea, 
Kazakhstan, Turkey, Morocco and Vietnam. China and India alone contributed 21 percent to 
the total number of outbound students. To the extent that doing business together, sharing 
networks, and a foreign education foster shared understanding and values, the global rich 
                                               
6 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-35957232   
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may more closely resemble a ‘class’ than do either a notional ‘global middle class’ or the 
global poor.7  
 
Below we show that the threshold for an individual to enter the global top 1% in 2012 is an 
annual income of about PPP$50,600 per capita household income, or PPP$202,000 for a 
family of four. We find that for many developed countries it includes the top 4% to 8% of 
their national income distribution. These income groups are much too large to constitute 
‘power elites’ within their own countries; they are likely to include senior professionals and 
some middle managers as well as business owners and ‘supermanagers’ (Piketty 2014: 291-
303). Among developing countries, Brazil has the largest share of its own population in the 
global top 1%, where 1.5% of its national distribution is in that group. For most developing 
countries the share is much smaller than 1%. We show that in emerging economies this group 
includes senior executives in large firms. Thus the global top 1% may be thought of as 
approximating the professional and technocratic elite – a global professional class – rather 
than just the super-rich.8 
 
An individual in the global top 0.1%, on the other hand, has a minimum of PPP$181,000 per 
capita household income, or about PPP$725,000 for a family of four. This comprises the top 
1% in the US, and the top 0.3% – 0.5% in Japan, Germany, France and the UK, the 
developed countries with the largest memberships of the club comprising the global top 
                                               
7 Robinson and Harris (2000: 18, cited in Hoffmann-Lange, 2012) went so far as to argue that the group of 
capitalists among the global elite (the “Transnational Capitalist Class”) “is class conscious, has become 
conscious of its transnationality and has been pursuing a class project of capitalist globalization, as reflected in 
its global decision-making and the rise of a transnational state apparatus under the auspices of this fraction.” 
8 See Hoffmann-Lange (2012) for a discussion of approaches to defining global elites. 
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0.1%. Even if less wealthy than the billionaires in the Forbes list, they are likely to wield 
significant power and influence.   
 
The threshold for an individual to enter the global top 10% in 2012 was about PPP$15,300 
per capita household income, or PPP$61,000 for a family of four. This income level would 
not count as ‘rich’ within a developed country: for most developed countries this group 
includes more than half their populations. For the US the top 60.4% of its population is in the 
global top 10%, and for Switzerland the corresponding figure is 71.2%. Of course, the global 
top 10% cannot include more than 10% of the population of every country, and for 
developing countries the number will be much smaller than 10%.   
 
We find that the advanced economies’ share of the global rich has declined in the last decade, 
with a corresponding rise in that of the emerging economies. We also find a concurrent 
decline in global inequality. However, it is important to realize that these two outcomes need 
not go together. For instance, if an emerging economy that has some representation in the 
global top 1% were suddenly to become wholly egalitarian, that would reduce its share of the 
global rich and also unambiguously reduce global inequality. Relatedly, a country’s 
membership of the global rich may expand if incomes grow throughout the national 
distribution while inequality remains constant, or if inequality increases with a rich minority 
(including those just below the threshold for the global top 1%) gaining more than the non-
rich majority. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that previously under-represented 
groups will benefit from some of their number reaching the elite. Zweigenhaft (2001: 279) 
notes that despite observing a dramatic increase in the diversity of the US elite in terms of the 
participation of women and minorities since the 1950s, there is “no evidence of a kinder, 
gentler power elite in how it functions ... and in terms of wealth and income they are now 
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further removed from the bulk of Americans ‘below them’.” The interests of a female 
executive, for instance, are more closely aligned with those of her firm’s shareholders than 
with those of any female workers she may employ. Similarly, citizens of developing 
countries who reach the global elite may simply find themselves further removed from their 
own compatriots.   
 
2. Data and methodology   
 
As in Anand and Segal (2015), this paper combines two sets of data: national household 
surveys covering most of the global population and economy, and data on the income share 
of the top 1% in 28 countries from the World Top Incomes Database. Here we update in five 
ways the global income distribution estimated in Anand and Segal (2015). First, in Anand 
and Segal (2015) we estimated the global distribution only up to 2005, whereas here we 
extend it to 2012. Second, we improve our imputation of top 1% shares, as described below. 
Third, we use the PPP conversion rates from the 2011 International Comparison Program 
(ICP), which represents an update and improvement over the 2005 ICP used in Anand and 
Segal (2015).10 Fourth, while our previous estimates used only PPP exchange rates to 
compare incomes across countries, here we also use market exchange rates – as discussed 
below. Fifth, we smooth the top decile of each country’s income distribution by estimating a 
Pareto density function for this group. 
 
                                               
10 Deaton and Aten (2014) argue that the methodology of the 2011 ICP was an improvement over that of the 
2005 ICP and that the differences between the two are primarily due to problems with the earlier round. They 
find that the 2005 consumption PPPs for countries in Asia (excluding Japan), Western Asia, and Africa were 
overstated relative to the US by between 18 and 26 percent.   
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Our household survey data up to 2005 are from Milanovic (2012), ‘benchmarked’ to the 
years 1988, 1993, 1998, 2002 and 2005. Milanovic’s data are provided in quantiles – in most 
cases 20 income groups each comprising 5% of the population, i.e. vigintiles. For our 2012 
‘benchmark year’ we use the most recent household survey data available post-2005 from the 
World Bank Povcalnet website. Of 129 surveyed countries, 109 of the surveys (or 84.5%) are 
from 2009 or later, i.e. within 3 years of the 2012 benchmark. The relative distributions 
within countries are assumed to remain constant between the survey year and 2012, while 
real incomes for non-2012 survey years are assumed to grow at the rate of real per capita 
HFCE in the country.   
 
As shown in Table 1, we have a total of 668 country-years in our dataset. Of these, 128 
country-years also have income tax data on the share of the top 1% of the population. These 
countries include the three most populous developing countries, all in Asia – China, India and 
Indonesia; three Latin American countries – Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay; one African 
country – South Africa; and all the G7 countries. See Appendix table A1 for these 128 
country-years.  
 
Our method for combining the top income data with household survey data follows our 
earlier procedure in Anand and Segal (2015), where it is discussed in detail. The rationale for 
using income tax data for top 1% shares is that household surveys typically fail to capture the 
richest members of society (Atkinson et al. 2011). For instance, the income share of the top 
1% in China in recent years was about 7% in surveys and about 12% in tax data.12 On this 
basis, we assume that household surveys are representative of only the bottom 99% of the 
                                               
12 Piketty et al (2016). In their estimates of total income, including imputations for non-taxed capital income, the 
share of the top 1% is slightly higher still at about 13%. 
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population in each country, and that the true top 1% share is that given by the tax data. Hence 
we multiply the population in each income group in the household surveys by 0.99, and 
append the top 1% with its income share independently estimated from the tax data. Our 
assumption that the top 1% is excluded from the survey sample implies that mean incomes in 
the surveys are underestimated, and our procedure thus results in a corresponding increase in 
mean (and total) income for each country.13   
 
Table 1: Coverage of countries and populations, 1988-2012  (updated 5 Jan 2017) 
Year 
Number of 
countries 
Population in 
billions (% of world 
population) 
1988 92 4.42 (87%) 
1993 104 5.05 (93%) 
1998 109 5.29 (89%) 
2002 115 5.74 (92%) 
2005 119 5.91 (91%) 
2012 129 6.41 (91%) 
Total 668  
Source: Authors’ calculations.   
 
For country-years that do not have top income data, we impute top 1% shares on the basis of 
regression. For countries with no top income data we impute values using a pooled OLS 
regression as follows:   
                                               
13 The augmented total income is calculated by assuming that the top 1%’s share of ‘control’ income as given in 
WTID is equal to its share of this augmented total income.   
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ݐ݋݌݋݊݁௜௧ = ܽ + ܾଵݐ݋݌ݐ݁݊௜௧ + ܾଶ݉݁ܽ݊݅݊ܿ௜௧ + ܾଷ݃݋ݒ௜௧ + ܾସܮܣܥ + ܾହݕ݁ܽݎ + ߝ௜௧ 
 
where i indexes countries, t indexes the year, topone is the income share of the top 1% (from 
WTID, in percentage points), topten is the income share of the top decile (from household 
surveys, in percentage points), meaninc is mean survey income, gov is government 
expenditure as a percent of GDP and LAC is the regional dummy. The regression covers 128 
country-years across 28 countries and yields the following estimates (with standard errors in 
parentheses): 
 
ݐ݋݌݋݊݁௜௧ = −182 + 0.265ݐ݋݌ݐ݁݊௜௧ + 0.165݉݁ܽ݊݅݊ܿ௜௧ − 0.236݃݋ݒ௜௧ + 4.65ܮܣܥ + 0.0933ݕ݁ܽݎ 
   (0.0378) (0.0351)       (0.0432)    (1.00)  (0.0263) 
 
All regressors are significant at the 1% level, and all have positive coefficients except for 
gov, which is negative. The R2 is 0.66, implying that the regression can explain two-thirds of 
the variation in the share of the top 1%. For countries that have top income data in some but 
not all years we run a fixed effects regression. See Appendix 2 for a table of regression 
results and a brief discussion of them.  
 
Having imputed top 1% shares across our dataset, the final step in constructing our country-
year distributions is to refine the top end of each distribution. For some countries the smallest 
groups at the top of the distribution are large in absolute terms compared with the size of the 
global top 1% or the global top 0.1%, whose composition we wish to identify. China is the 
obvious case, where the top 1% in 2012 has over 13 million people, or about 0.2% of the 
world’s population. For a more fine-grained analysis, we estimate a Pareto coefficient for the 
14 
 
top 10% for each country-year using the income shares of the top 10% and the top 1% (from 
the data, or estimated as above). We then break down the top 10% into 1,000 groups each of 
size 0.01% from percentile 90.00 to percentile 99.99, using the estimated Pareto coefficients 
to calculate their respective income shares.14   
 
Lakner and Milanovic (2013, 2015) take a different approach to imputing top income shares 
in estimating global inequality between 1988 and 2008.15 While their main results are based 
on household surveys alone, they present alternative estimates which adjust higher incomes 
as follows. Following Banerjee and Piketty’s (2010) finding that in India a significant part of 
the discrepancy between estimates of consumption expenditure in the national accounts 
(denoted HFCE) and in household surveys can be accounted for by missing or under-reported 
top incomes, Lakner and Milanovic (2013, 2015) attribute the difference between HFCE and 
survey incomes (when the latter is smaller than the former) entirely to the top decile of the 
national distribution in each country-year, and add this residual to the income of the top 
decile reported in the survey. They then smooth the top decile using a Pareto distribution, 
also following the procedure described in Atkinson (2007).16 Their method assumes that 
                                               
14 Atkinson (2007: 24) shows that ௜ܵ/ ௝ܵ = ൫ܪ௜/ܪ௝൯
ೌషభ
ೌ  where Si and Sj are the income shares of the top groups 
with population shares Hi and Hj, and a is the Pareto coefficient. We estimate the Pareto coefficient for each 
country-year by inverting this formula and using the income shares of the top 10% and top 1%. We then use the 
formula to partition the top 10% into 0.01% groups by using the top 10% share and the Pareto coefficient to 
calculate the implied shares of the top 9.99%, the top 9.98%, and so on, subtracting sequentially to obtain 0.01% 
shares. Thus the share of percentile 90.01 is equal to the share of the top 10% minus the share of the top 9.99%, 
the share of percentile 90.02 is equal to the share of the top 9.99% minus the share of the top 9.98%, and so on.   
15 The following two paragraphs draw on Anand and Segal (2015).   
16 They calculate a Pareto coefficient for each country-year distribution on the basis of the unadjusted survey 
incomes in the ninth and tenth deciles and use it to estimate income shares for the income groups P90-P95 (i.e., 
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HFCE per capita is the correct measure of mean consumption expenditure (or income) when, 
and only when, it is larger than the corresponding survey mean.  
 
Anand and Segal (2008, 2015) provide reasons to prefer survey consumption expenditures 
(incomes) to HFCE from the national accounts. Recent revisions of national accounts 
estimates have also highlighted the unreliability of national accounts in developing countries, 
particularly in the poorer countries (Jerven 2013). Lakner and Milanovic (2013, 2015) 
themselves point out that their assumption is “excessive” in some cases. For example, in 2008 
in India – the country that motivated their procedure – they find the survey mean to be only 
53% of HFCE per capita, so they attribute the remaining 47% of total HFCE entirely to the 
top decile. This adjustment seems excessively large to us. Conversely, for China in both 1988 
and 2008, HFCE is smaller than survey income, so no adjustment is made by the authors for 
under-reporting or under-sampling of top incomes.   
 
Our estimates, on the other hand, suffer from the fact that top income data refer to pre-tax 
income of taxable units – which are usually individuals but in some cases are households –
while household surveys refer to either consumption expenditure or post-tax disposable 
income. By using the top income shares rather than the absolute incomes reported in the top 
incomes data we avoid conflating the levels of post-tax and pre-tax income, but differences 
between the distributions of pre-tax income and consumption expenditure or post-tax income 
will be a source of error in our estimates. 
 
                                               
percentile 90 to percentile 95), P95-P99 and P99-P100, yielding 12 income groups per country-year including 
deciles D1 to D9.   
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More generally, as Bourguignon (2015: 45) observes, “procedures of estimating global 
standard of living inequality are approximate.” Anand and Segal (2008: 87ff) describe a 
range of sources of error inherent in any estimation of global inequality, including those due 
to errors in surveys, noncomparability of surveys, errors in national accounts, and errors in 
PPP exchange rates. As they also point out, there is no procedure for estimating standard 
errors that would account for these sources of error.  
 
3. Results   
Global inequality: declining at last?   
 
We provide all estimates based on global distributions in PPP$, and in some cases we also 
provide estimates based on market exchange rates (FX$). For the measurement of global 
interpersonal income inequality there is limited justification in using the FX$ distribution 
(Anand and Segal 2008). However, we have already mentioned that the global top 1% and 
global top 0.1% are likely to have more international lifestyles than the rest of the population, 
suggesting that a possibly-significant portion of their expenditures is priced at market 
exchange rates.17 Thus a rich Indian who can enjoy the real expenditures of the global top 1% 
in her own country will find her spending power severely curtailed when she travels to a 
developed country which may be three or four times more expensive, when measured at 
market exchange rates. Thus for comparison we estimate the composition of the global top 
10%, top 1% and top 0.1% in FX$ as well as in PPP$.   
 
                                               
17 Such expenditures might typically include the purchase of homes, children’s education, holidays, and medical 
expenditures in foreign countries.   
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Figures 1 and 2 and table 3 show inequality trends between 1988 and 2012. Global inequality 
measured by the Gini, MLD (i.e. Theil L), and Theil T changed very little between 1988 and 
2005, but declined in 2012. The decline in the Gini coefficient is greater than 0.03, 
Atkinson’s (2015) threshold for ‘salience’. The two decomposable measures, MLD and Theil 
T, show that within-country inequality was rising up to 2005 – which was offset by declining 
between-country inequality – but that from 2005 to 2012 even this trend reversed. However, 
for both measures, within-country inequality remained higher in 2012 than in any year prior 
to the peak of 2005 (table 3).   
 
Figure 1: Global inequality indices, 1988–2012   
 
Source: Authors’ calculations   
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Figure 2: Global top income shares, 1988–2012   
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations.   
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Table 3: Global inequality 1988–2012, PPP$ unless specified as FX$ 
  
Income 
share of 
top 10% 
Income 
share of 
top 10%, 
FX$ 
Income 
share of 
top 1% 
Income 
share of 
top 1%, 
FX$ 
Income 
share of 
top 
0.1% 
Income 
share of 
top 
0.1%, 
FX$ Gini MLD 
Between-
country 
MLD 
Within-
country 
MLD Theil T 
Between-
country 
Theil 
Within-
country 
Theil 
1988 56.1% 65.3% 17.0% 19.1% 5.6% 6.2% 0.701 1.014 0.742 0.272 1.061 0.678 0.383 
1993 56.8% 69.9% 17.2% 20.9% 5.5% 6.5% 0.702 1.013 0.687 0.326 1.062 0.653 0.409 
1998 57.7% 69.2% 19.0% 22.5% 6.6% 7.8% 0.696 0.971 0.637 0.334 1.100 0.648 0.452 
2002 59.2% 72.7% 19.6% 24.3% 6.8% 8.5% 0.708 1.006 0.669 0.337 1.149 0.690 0.459 
2005 57.8% 70.9% 20.2% 24.4% 7.7% 9.4% 0.702 1.023 0.639 0.384 1.150 0.635 0.515 
2012 54.1% 65.2% 18.2% 22.0% 6.6% 8.1% 0.668 0.874 0.511 0.363 1.012 0.508 0.503 
 
Note: FX$ signifies market exchange rates.   
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The income shares of all of the top 10%, top 1% and top 0.1% also rise and then decline, 
peaking in 2002 for the top 10% and in 2005 for the top 1% and top 0.1% (figure 2 and table 
3). The global top 1% in 2012 comprised 64.2 million people in our sample of countries, and 
we find that an individual needed an annual per capita household income of approximately 
PPP$50,600 (i.e. PPP$202,000 for a family of four) in order to be included.18 The top 0.1% 
comprised 6.4 million people, with a threshold of PPP$181,200 annual per capita household 
income. In 2012 the income share of the top 1% was 18.2% for the PPP$ distribution and 
22.0% for the FX$ distribution. This implies that the average incomes of the top 1% are 18 to 
22 times higher than the world average, depending on the exchange rate used to define the 
distribution. Average incomes of the top 0.1% are 66 times higher than the world average for 
the PPP$ distribution, and 81 times higher for the FX$ distribution. Market exchange rates 
inflate incomes in richer countries relative to poorer countries, when compared with PPP 
exchange rates. Thus global top income shares are higher using FX$ than PPP$ because the 
majority of individuals in those income groups are in rich countries.  
 
Lakner and Milanovic (2015) similarly find little movement in the Gini up to 2003, and a 
decline by all measures from 2003 to 2008. In conjunction with our findings, this suggests 
that the turning point for global inequality is around 2005. However, we find the level of 
inequality to be higher than their estimates, presumably because of our inclusion of top 
income data (see their table A.319). Our Gini coefficients are only slightly higher, of the order 
of 0.01, but our Theil T estimates are more than 10% higher. The larger difference with the 
                                               
18 Milanovic (2011), using household surveys alone, found that the threshold for the global top 1% in 2005 was 
a per capita household income of PPP$34,000, based on PPPs from the 2005 ICP.   
19 This table uses 2011 PPPs so it is more comparable with our estimates than are their main results, which use 
2005 PPPs. 
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Theil T is probably due to the fact that this measure is more sensitive than the Gini to 
inequality at the top of the distribution. Similarly, our top 1% share is substantially higher at 
17.0% in 1988 compared to their 11.8%, peaking at 20.2% in 2005 compared to their peak of 
15.7% in 2008.20  
 
A more detailed picture of changes in the global distribution over the whole period of 1988–
2012 emerges in the growth incidence curve of figure 3, which shows income growth by 
decile, with the top decile partitioned into the percentile group 91-99 and the top 1%, with the 
top 0.1% shown separately. This reveals that the decline in inequality shown by the three 
inequality indices in figure 1 is driven by the fact that only deciles 9 and 10, but excluding 
the top 1% (and top 0.1%), saw their incomes grow by less than the global mean. Put another 
way, changes in the relative distribution were equivalent to transfers away from this group 
and towards others, both poorer (deciles 1 to 8) and richer (top 1%). Inequality among the 
bottom 6 deciles unambiguously increased with higher deciles showing faster growth. The 
dominant picture is one of ‘middle-class growth’, with deciles 4, 5 and 6 seeing the highest 
rates of growth at over 60% compared to a global average growth of 29%. While the global 
top 1% did better than average at 38% growth, and better than the rest of the 9th and 10th 
deciles, their incomes grew by less than that of any of the bottom 7 deciles.21 The global top 
0.1% did substantially better than average at 51%, but were still surpassed by deciles 2 to 7.   
                                               
20 Their top 1% share estimates, however, are calculated using 2005 PPPs (their table 3), and are not given in 
2011 PPPs. They find inequality to be lower using 2011 PPPs than 2005 PPPs so presumably their top 1% 
shares would be lower still using 2011 PPPs, implying a still-larger difference with our estimates. 
21 Figure 3 can be contrasted with Lakner and Milanovic’s (2015: 27, figure A1) growth incidence curve for 
1988–2008, which is based on household surveys alone. The shape is similar, except that in their estimates the 
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Figure 3: Cumulative growth rate 1988–2012, by income group   
  
Source: Authors’ calculations   
Note: D1 to D9 are deciles. P91-P99 represents 9% of the population from the 91st percentile 
to the 99th percentile. The red dashed line shows mean income growth over the period.   
Figure 4: Income shares (%) of top 1% in 30 countries 1980–2014, with estimated time 
trends   
 
Source: World Top Incomes Database and authors’ calculations.   
Note: Time trends estimated using fixed effects OLS regression. See text for details.   
                                               
top 1% enjoys much higher growth of about 63% over their period. However, in their estimates the income 
share of the global top 1% remains substantially smaller than in our estimates, as noted above.  
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
0
5
10
15
20
25
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
23 
 
 
The income share of the global top 1% declined between 2005 and 2012, but what about the 
income shares of the top 1% within each country? These top income shares increased on 
average between 1980 and 2014, rising substantially in some countries, including the Anglo-
Saxon countries, while remaining fairly flat in others (Roine and Waldenström 2015: 492-3). 
However, we find that the income shares of the top 1% within countries start to trend 
downwards after 2005 (figure 4) – around the same time as global inequality, within-country 
inequality, and the income share of the global top 1% start to decline (table 3). In particular, 
country-fixed effects regressions of the income share of the top 1% on year yield positive 
coefficients for every sub-period 1980–2014, 1981–2014 up to 2004–2014, turning negative 
for the sub-period 2005–2014 and later.22 Figure 4 plots these top income shares and the 
estimated time trends for 1980–2014 and 2005–2014. China, the most populous country in 
the world, exemplifies this aggregate trend: its top 1% share of fiscal income rose to a peak in 
2005 and declined every subsequent year to 2012. 
 
Regional and country composition of global top income groups   
 
Figure 5 plots the regional population shares of the global top 1% between 1988 and 2012. 
The advanced economies account for a large majority of the population of the global top 1%, 
but while their share in the PPP$ distribution varied within a narrow range of 85.5% to 87.7% 
from 1988 to 2005, it dropped substantially to 77.4% in 2012. Latin America and the 
                                               
22 For each period from year t to year 2014, where t = 1980 to 2007, we regressed country top 1% shares on the 
year and a set of country dummies. The coefficient on the year is positive and significant for every sub-period 
up to 2003–2014; it is positive and insignificant for 2004–2014; and negative starting in 2005 (for which sub-
period there are 26 countries with data). The negative coefficient becomes significant at the 5% level for 2007–
2014 (where there are 26 countries with data).   
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Caribbean is the region with the next largest share in the PPP$ distribution, which declined 
from 11.6% in 1988 to 6.5% in 2005 and then rose to 8.5% in 2012 – still well below its 
share in 1988. The biggest regional rises since 2005 are for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, driven by Russia, and East Asia and the Pacific, driven by China. China 
enters the global top 1% in the PPP$ distribution in 1993, but only with its top 0.01%, the 
finest division in our estimates. These 118 thousand people comprised 0.2% of the population 
of the global top 1% in 1993. Only in 2002 do additional Chinese groups enter the global top 
1%, and by 2012 the top 0.22% of the Chinese national distribution reaches that level, 
comprising 4.6% of the population of the global top 1%.   
 
Unsurprisingly, the US has the largest number of people in the global top 1%, with US 
citizens comprising 37.0% of this group in 2012 (table 4). However, this is a substantial 
decline from its peak of 49.2% in 1998. The US is also the country with the highest share of 
its own population in the global top 1%: in 2012, 7.7% of the US population was in the global 
top 1% (see table 5). Switzerland comes in a close second with 7.1% of its population in the 
global top 1%, but since it is a much smaller country, these rich Swiss comprise only 0.9% of 
the global top 1%.   
 
The developing country with the largest share of the global top 1% is Brazil, with 4.7% in 
2012 – just above China’s 4.6%. This is because it is not only large and relatively prosperous, 
but its very high level of inequality also implies that rich Brazilians are particularly rich 
(while the non-rich are correspondingly poor), allowing more of them to pass the threshold. 
China and Brazil were in fourth and fifth place in 2012, surpassing the three G7 countries 
Canada, Italy and the UK. India, with the second largest population in the world, just misses 
inclusion in tables 4 and 5 with the 21st largest share of the population of the global top 1%, 
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at 0.58%% in 2012, representing the top 0.3% of its national distribution. Over the period 
1988 to 1998 only the top 0.1% of India’s national distribution passed the threshold, 
comprising 0.2% of the global top 1%.  
 
The global top 0.1% is dominated by the US, which comprised 48.7% of this group in 2012. 
China accounted for 4.2%, with Brazil’s share dropping to 2.5%.  
 
For the FX$ distribution, developing countries are virtually excluded from the top 1%, with 
the advanced economies accounting for between 93.8% and 97.0% over 1988 to 2005 – 
though even on this measure their share declined after 2005, down to 91.0% in 2012.  As in 
the PPP$ distribution, in 2012 the US dominates, accounting for 36.1% of the population of 
the global top 1% – with 7.5% of its own population in this group. The US share of the global 
FX$ top 1% was down in 2012 from its peak of 50.1% in 2002. Both Australia and 
Switzerland had higher shares of their own populations in the global top 1%, at 10.9% of the 
Australian population (3.7% of the global top 1%) and 23.8% of the Swiss population (3.0% 
of the global top 1%) – see tables 4 and 5. These exceptionally high numbers were due to 
temporarily-high valuations of their currencies: for Australia in particular the share of the 
global top 1% in FX$ was much smaller in previous years (table 4).   
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Table 4: Country population shares of global top 1%, 1988–2012   
Country population share of PPP$ global top 1% (%)       Country population share of FX$ global top 1% (%)   
 1988 1993 1998 2002 2005 2012 
 1988 1993 1998 2002 2005 2012 
United States 41.6 42.0 49.2 46.3 45.0 37.0  36.3 36.2 47.5 50.1 43.2 36.1 
Japan 8.1 8.3 7.1 8.0 6.7 8.3  22.5 24.7 15.6 16.3 10.4 12.7 
Germany 8.7 6.5 5.6 5.1 7.1 5.6  9.1 7.6 6.2 4.8 8.3 6.3 
France 4.2 5.7 3.6 7.2 4.3 5.5  5.2 7.4 4.3 6.2 5.8 7.1 
Brazil 4.6 3.2 3.8 3.3 2.9 4.7  1.6 1.1 2.8 0.7 1.0 3.4 
China 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.9 3.1 4.6  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 1.5 
UK 3.7 4.8 4.4 5.3 7.1 4.6  3.4 4.0 5.2 5.8 9.1 5.8 
Russia 0.0 2.9 0.3 0.3 0.8 3.1  0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 
Canada 3.8 3.0 2.5 2.3 2.9 2.8  3.5 2.6 1.8 1.9 3.0 4.1 
Korea, Rep. 2.6 2.7 1.3 1.9 2.3 2.4  0.7 1.2 0.3 1.0 1.6 1.6 
Australia 1.6 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.0 2.1  1.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.3 3.7 
Italy 2.5 2.4 4.2 2.2 2.9 2.1  2.4 1.9 3.7 1.8 3.6 2.2 
Spain 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.9 1.5 1.1  0.8 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.1 
South Africa 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.0 1.0  0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Mexico 2.2 2.2 1.4 0.9 1.2 0.9  1.0 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Switzerland 1.6 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.9  3.1 2.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 3.0 
Netherlands 0.4 1.2 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.8  0.4 1.2 0.7 0.7 1.2 1.0 
Colombia 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.8  0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 
Malaysia 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.7  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Chile 0.2 0.5 1.5 0.2 0.5 0.6  0.1 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.4 
Total of above 20 87.9 90.8 90.9 89.5 91.4 89.7  91.8 94.0 93.6 94.1 93.6 92.0 
Note: In both panels countries are ranked according to their population share in the PPP$ global top 1% in the year 2012.   
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Table 5: Characteristics of top 20 countries in 2012   
 PPP$ global distribution              FX$ global distribution         
  
Country's 
share of 
global 
sample 
population 
Population 
share of 
global top 
10% 
Population 
share of 
global top 
1% 
Population 
share of 
global top 
0.1% 
% of 
country's 
population 
in global 
top 10% 
% of 
country's 
population 
in global 
top 1% 
Top 1% 
threshold 
in LCU, 
per capita 
household 
income 
Top 0.1% 
threshold 
in LCU, 
per capita 
household 
income  
Population 
share of 
global top 
1% 
% of 
country's 
population 
in global 
top 1% 
Top 1% 
threshold 
in LCU, 
per capita 
household 
income 
Population 
share of 
top 0.1% 
Top 0.1% 
threshold in 
LCU, per 
capita 
household 
income 
United States 4.8% 29.1% 37.0% 48.7% 60.4% 7.7% 50,635 181,217 36.1% 7.5% 51,438 49.1% 180,388 
Japan 2.0% 11.1% 8.3% 6.2% 55.4% 4.2% 5.706m 20.422m 
 
12.7% 6.3% 4.104m 9.8% 14.393m 
Germany 1.3% 7.1% 5.6% 6.1% 55.4% 4.4% 41,371 148,059 
 
6.3% 4.9% 40,019 7.1% 140,342 
France 1.0% 5.4% 5.5% 3.0% 52.4% 5.3% 44,854 160,528 
 
7.1% 7.0% 40,019 4.0% 140,342 
Brazil 3.1% 3.1% 4.7% 2.5% 10.0% 1.5% 86,735 310,414 
 
3.4% 1.1% 100,462 1.9% 352,310 
China 21.0% 5.3% 4.6% 4.2% 2.5% 0.2% 188,173 673,443 
 
1.5% 0.1% 324,693 2.1% 1.139m 
UK 1.0% 4.5% 4.6% 4.2% 45.5% 4.6% 38,812 138,901 
 
5.8% 6.0% 32,563 5.6% 114,194 
Russia 2.2% 3.1% 3.1% 1.8% 13.9% 1.4% 847,444 3.033m 
 
0.6% 0.3% 1.586m 0.4% 5.563m 
Canada 0.5% 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 55.4% 5.2% 65,299 233,698 
 
4.1% 7.7% 51,396 4.2% 180,241 
Korea, Rep. 0.8% 3.1% 2.4% 2.2% 40.6% 3.2% 46,177,386 165.262m 
 
1.6% 2.0% 57.943m 1.4% 203.202m 
Australia 0.3% 1.9% 2.1% 1.3% 55.4% 6.2% 77,375 276,916 
 
3.7% 10.9% 49,679 2.8% 174,219 
Italy 0.9% 2.8% 2.1% 1.6% 30.7% 2.2% 42,529 152,206 
 
2.2% 2.4% 40,019 1.8% 140,342 
Spain 0.7% 1.9% 1.1% 0.6% 25.7% 1.6% 39,062 139,797 
 
1.1% 1.5% 40,019 0.6% 140,342 
South Africa 0.8% 0.8% 1.0% 0.6% 10.0% 1.3% 265,607 950,570 
 
0.5% 0.6% 422,304 0.2% 1.481m 
Mexico 1.9% 1.1% 0.9% 0.6% 6.0% 0.5% 464,741 1.663m 
 
0.4% 0.2% 677,409 0.4% 2,375,611 
Switzerland 0.1% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 71.2% 7.1% 78,653 281,487 
 
3.0% 23.8% 48,233 2.1% 169,147 
Netherlands 0.3% 1.4% 0.8% 0.3% 55.4% 3.1% 44,611 159,657 
 
1.0% 4.0% 40,019 0.4% 140,342 
Colombia 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.9% 7.7% 1.0% 61.266m 219.262m 
 
0.4% 0.5% 92.429m 0.4% 324.138m 
Malaysia 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 0.2% 15.8% 1.5% 79,986 286,260 
 
0.1% 0.2% 158,881 0.0% 557,182 
Chile 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 0.5% 11.9% 2.3% 19.827m 70.959m 
 
0.4% 1.3% 25.023m 0.3% 87.754m 
Total of above 
20 
44.2% 87.0% 89.7% 88.9% 
     
92.0% 
  
94.6% 
 
Note: In both panels countries are ranked according to their population share in the PPP$ global top 1% in the year 2012.   
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Figure 5: Regional composition of PPP$ global top 1% (left panel) and FX$ global top 1% (right panel)   
 
 
Note: ADV is Advanced Economies; LAC is Latin America and the Caribbean; EAP is East Asia and the Pacific (developing only); CIS is Commonwealth of 
Independent States; SSA is Sub-Saharan Africa; EURDEV is Emerging and Developing Europe; MENA is Middle East and North Africa; SA is South Asia.   
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4. Alternative identifications of the global elite: wealth, WEF, and executive 
compensation   
 
We can also compare our global top incomes estimates at market exchange rates with the 
global wealth estimates produced for the bank Credit Suisse by Davies et al. (2012), also at 
market exchange rates. However, while our data are provided in terms of household income 
per capita, giving children the same weight as adults, Davies et al. (2012: 6) use income per 
adult, with adults defined as individuals aged at least 20. First consider the thresholds for 
entering the global top 1% by income and the global top 1% by wealth. At market exchange 
rates we find the threshold for the global top 1% in income is US$51,400 per capita 
household income, or about US$206,000 for a family of two adults and two children. Davies 
et al. (2012: 92) find the threshold for the global top 1% in wealth to be US$710,000 per 
adult, or US$1.42 million for such a household. A plausible real return of 5% on this wealth 
would be US$71,000, not nearly enough to reach the top 1% in the global income distribution 
at FX$. This reflects the fact that most of the income of rich, if not super-rich, households is 
salary or labour income.23   
 
We can also compare the country composition of the global top 1% by income and that of the 
global top 1% by wealth. Using market exchange rates, Davies et al. (2012: 101) find that in 
2012 US residents comprised 35.7% of the global top 1% by wealth, China accounted for 
                                               
23 Piketty (2014: 277) finds that in France in 2005 capital income exceeds labour income only for those in the 
richest 0.1% of the income distribution. In 1932 this applied to the top 0.5%, and in the Belle Epoque to the 
entire top percentile. The figure of 5% as a typical real return on wealth is also proposed by Piketty. However, 
we would note that standard income surveys that include capital income do not account for the erosion of wealth 
by inflation and report nominal, not real, income from wealth, which is correspondingly higher (e.g. a return of 
7% if the real return is 5% and inflation is 2%).   
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3.3%, and India 0.5%. The US figure is similar to its value for the global top 1% by income 
at FX$ (table 4). For China and India these shares by wealth are more than double their 
shares by income at FX$, which are respectively 1.5% (table 4) and 0.2% (not shown).  
 
The pattern is different again at the very top of the global wealth distribution, according to 
Forbes’s global estimates of the numbers of (wealth) billionaires. China’s share of the 
world’s billionaires in 2012 was substantially higher than its share of the global top 1% of 
income or of wealth – at 95 out of a total of 1,226, or 7.7% (Kroll 2012). In 2016 China’s 
share of billionaires rose to 14%, India’s to 4.6%. These findings imply that both China and 
India are more represented in the global top 1% by wealth than by income, and more 
represented again at the level of global billionaires. This implies that their wealth 
distributions are particularly unequal at the very top, relative to other countries.   
 
Beyond the question of wealth, the World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting at Davos 
represents a different set of the global super-elite and includes policy makers as well as 
business people. We find that the composition of this group has changed less than 
membership of global top income groups. Figure 6 shows the share of attendees at the WEF 
with citizenship of advanced economies, and who are resident in advanced economies, for the 
period 2002–2016. The advanced economies’ share of attendees has declined since its peak in 
2006 from 78% by citizens or 80% by residents, to 74% for both in 2016. This decline 
coincides with the decline in their share of the global top 1% shown in figure 5, but is less 
less pronounced. 
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Figure 6: Share of World Economic Forum attendees with residence in or citizenship of 
advanced economies, 2002–2016   
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Event registration, World Economic Forum, Switzerland.   
Figure 7: Share of World Economic Forum attendees by region of residence, 2002-2016   
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Event registration, World Economic Forum, Switzerland.   
Note: ADV is Advanced Economies; LAC is Latin America and the Caribbean; EAP is East 
Asia and the Pacific (developing only); CIS is Commonwealth of Independent States; SSA is 
Sub-Saharan Africa; EURDEV is Emerging and Developing Europe; MENA is Middle East 
and North Africa; SA is South Asia.    
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Figure 7 shows the shares of WEF attendees of other regions over the same period. Most saw 
a rise in their share, with the Commonwealth of Independent States, South Asia, and East 
Asia and the Pacific all more than doubling their shares during 2002–2016. Only Emerging 
and Developing Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean saw their shares decline. The 
trends by citizenship, rather than residence, are similar but show slightly smaller rises (as 
implied by figure 6). It is also notable that of 132 of the 2016 attendees with Indian 
nationality, only 98 were resident in India, indicating that Indians have taken up elite 
positions in other countries. China, on the other hand, is an importer of such elites, with 76 
attendees resident in China but only 66 Chinese nationals.   
 
We now turn to estimates of executive compensation to get a picture of which kinds of 
occupations will secure a household a place in the global top 1%. The international 
recruitment agency Robert Walters runs surveys of salaries paid by large multinational and 
domestic firms, including in five of the developing countries in tables 4 and 5 – namely 
Brazil, China, Malaysia, South Africa and South Korea.24 Salary ranges for the highest paid 
executives in each country are reported in table 6. We saw that in China, 0.22% of the 
population had a per capita household income above the threshold of ¥188,173 (table 5), or 
about ¥753 thousand for a four-person household. A single earner would need ¥1.05m to 
achieve this income after tax,25 which is significantly less than the salary (excluding bonus) 
of a chief financial officer (CFO) with 18 years’ experience in accounting and finance, who 
could earn up to ¥2.5m, or a country manager in sales and marketing (for the category of 
‘consumer – retail and luxury’) who could earn up to ¥2.2m (table 6).   
                                               
24 Note, however, that South Korea has been classified as a ‘high income’ country by the World Bank 
continuously since 2001.   
25 See the Appendix for sources for personal income tax rates. 
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In Brazil, where 1.5% of the country’s population are in the global top 1%, many senior 
executives are also likely to be included. There, to place a family of four in the global top 1% 
in 2012 required R$347,000 of disposable income (table 5), or about R$480,000 before tax. 
This would be towards the lower range of salaries for a CFO with over 12 years of experience 
in an accounting and finance firm, or a chief operating officer (COO) in banking and 
financial services. It would be mid-range for the Chief Information Officer in an information 
technology firm or near the top end for the Director of a human resources firm.   
 
In Malaysia, where 1.5% of the population is in the global top 1%, the threshold is about 
MYR320,000 for a family of four, which could be achieved by a single earner with a gross 
salary of MYR484,000 before tax. This is near the top of the range for a CFO in accounting 
and finance; the top of the range for an experienced director in sales or marketing; and 
slightly more than a top-range salary for a Director in a human resources firm or a Chief 
Technology Officer in an IT firm. In South Africa the threshold would be about ZAR1.06m 
disposable income or ZAR1.65m gross, which is near the top end for a Corporate Finance 
CA, at the top end for an Audit/Tax/Accounting/Treasury/Senior Level Director in 
accounting, finance, banking or financial services, and about 15% above the top end for the 
General Manager of an engineering or natural resources firm. In South Korea, a family of 
four needs ₩185m disposable income, or ₩205m gross. This is a top-range salary for a CFO 
in accounting and finance or a Country Head in a small/medium sales and marketing firm.  
These data suggest that top executives in major firms in emerging economies tend to be 
around the borderline of the global top 1%, except in China where they are comfortably 
within that group.   
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Table 6: Executive compensation, 2012, with threshold for global top 1% (PPP$ distribution) 
 Global top 1% 
threshold for 4-person 
household, LCU 
Position Salary range, 
LCU 
Brazil 
(Rio de 
Janeiro) 
Gross: R$480k 
Net: R$347k 
Accounting and Finance – CFO (12+ 
years experience) 
R$420k-R$600k 
 Banking and Financial Services – 
COO (12+ years experience) 
R$420k-580k 
 Human Resources – Director (12+ 
years experience) 
R$315-500k 
 Information Technology – Chief 
Information Officer 
R$400k-550k 
China 
(Shanghai) 
Gross: ¥1.05m 
Net: ¥753k 
Accounting and Finance – CFO (18+ 
years experience) 
¥1.5m-2.5m 
 Sales and Marketing – General 
Manager 
¥1.2m-2.2m 
Malaysia 
(Kuala 
Lumpur) 
Gross: MYR484k Accounting and Finance – CFO RM273k-500k 
Net: MYR320k Sales and Marketing – Director (10+ 
years experience) 
RM300k-480k 
 Human Resources – Director RM265k-420k 
 Information Technology – Chief 
Technology Officer 
RM350k-420k 
South 
Africa 
Gross: ZAR1.65m Corporate Finance – CA ZAR830k-1.8m 
Net: ZAR1.06m Accounting, Finance, Banking and 
Financial Services – Senior Director 
ZAR900k-1.6m 
 Engineering or Natural Resources – 
General Manager 
ZAR800k-1.4m 
South 
Korea 
(Seoul) 
Gross: ₩205m Accounting and Finance – CFO W130m-200m 
Net: ₩185m Sales and Marketing Firm – Small/ 
Medium Organisation Country Head 
W150m-200m 
 
Source: Robert Walters (2013).  Note: CFO is Chief Financial Officer; COO is Chief 
Operating Officer. Figures usually exclude bonuses.   
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5. Conclusion   
 
It is well established that the rise of the emerging economies has driven fundamental changes 
in the distribution of global income in terms of both poverty reduction and the changing 
composition of the global ‘middle class’. We find that this change is also apparent in the 
ranks of the global rich, but to a moderate extent: the advanced economies, comprising only 
14% of the world’s population, still accounted for 77% of the global top 1% in 2012, at PPP$. 
But this was substantially lower than the 85-88% during 1988 to 2005. The rise of China is 
clear in these data, and in 2012 both China and Brazil surpassed three of the G7 countries in 
their shares of the global top 1%. The other giant of the developing world, India, has made 
limited incursions into the global top 1%, despite rapid economic growth over the past three 
decades. But both China and, to a lesser extent, India, are substantially more dominant at the 
level of wealth billionaires.   
 
The turning point for the participation of the emerging economies in the global income rich 
appears to have been around 2005, which mirrors our finding that the advanced economies’ 
share of WEF attendees peaked in 2006 and has been on a declining trend since then. 
Moreover, we find that global inequality starts to decline around the same time, and that top 
1% income shares within countries start to decline also from 2005. This trend was no doubt 
sharpened by the global financial crisis in 2008, which is having a lasting effect of slow 
growth in the advanced countries. But many developing countries were already converging 
with the developed economies before that point. As long as emerging economies continue to 
grow faster than the developed countries – which seems likely for the near future – we can 
expect both trends to continue.   
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The increasingly international lives of the global rich imply that, as a class, they probably 
have more in common than other quantiles of the global income distribution. In emerging 
economies like China, Brazil, Malaysia and South Africa, the members of the global top 1% 
include top executives in large firms, in addition to wealthy capital- and land-owning elites. 
Their professional lives will often involve international travel and deal-making associated 
with global commerce and investment, including (at the very top) at the World Economic 
Forum – fostering shared understandings and perhaps increasing awareness of common 
financial interests. We can only speculate about the consequences of the rising participation 
of the rich from poorer countries in international fora and the global elite. It is by no means 
clear that it will contribute to declining global inequality, or benefit the non-rich within 
developing countries. Senior executives and business owners from different countries may 
find that they share more interests with each other than with their own compatriots.   
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Appendix 1: Data 
Sources 
 
Household survey data in local currency up to 2005 are due to Banko Milanovic and 
downloaded from https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Page-Elements/Academics-Research-Centers-
Initiatives/Centers-and-Institutes/Stone-Center-on-Socio-Economic-Inequality/Core-Faculty,-
Team,-and-Affiliated-LIS-Scholars/Branko-Milanovic/Datasets.  
 
For benchmark year 2012 we downloaded household survey data from Povcalnet, 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/. Most data were downloaded on 6 July 2015. Data 
for 8 countries that were previously unavailable were downloaded 3 November 2016. These 
are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. The only 
country in benchmark 2012 not from the World Bank is Korea, for which we used data for 
2008 from Milanovic, above, updated to 2012 in the same way as other benchmark 2012 data. 
All household survey data are converted to 2012 international PPP$, based on the 2011 ICP 
inflated to 2012 prices using US CPI. 
 
Data on the income shares of the top 1% within countries were downloaded on 3 July 2015 
from the World Top Incomes Database: http://topincomes.g-
mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/. Estimates for China using income tax data were released 
26 December 2016 (Piketty et al. 2016) and were downloaded from the World Wealth and 
Income Database (beta), wid.world. We use the series for fiscal data rather than for pre-tax 
national income to increase comparability with other countries. See Table A1 for the 128 
country-years across 28 countries with both household survey and top 1% share data. Of 
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these, 14 country-years across 8 countries have consumption surveys while the remaining are 
income surveys. 
 
Table A1: Country-years with household survey data and income tax data for top 1% share 
 1988 1993 1998 2002 2005 2012 
Argentina   x x   
Australia x x x x x x 
Canada x x x x x x 
China x x x x x x 
Colombia  x x x x  
Denmark x x x x x x 
Finland x x x x x  
France x x x x x x 
Germany   x x x  
India x x x    
Indonesia  x x x   
Ireland x x x x x  
Italy x x x x x  
Japan x x x x x x 
Korea, Rep. x   x x x 
Malaysia x x  x x x 
Netherlands  x x x x x 
New Zealand x x x    
Norway x x x x x x 
Portugal  x x  x  
Singapore x x x x   
South Africa  x  x  x 
Spain x x x x x x 
Sweden x x x x x x 
Switzerland  x x x x  
United Kingdom x x x x x x 
United States x x x x x x 
Uruguay      x 
 
Other country-level variables including national accounts data and price indices are from the  
World Bank’s World Development Indicators website, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators 
 
Data on income tax rates for table 6 come from the following sources:  
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Brazil: We assume a personal income tax rate of 27.5%, which was the higher rate in Brazil 
in 2015 and would apply to almost all this income. PWC Worldwide Tax Summaries, Brazil, 
http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/uk/taxsummaries/wwts.nsf/ID/Brazil-Individual-Taxes-on-
personal-income 
China: Piketty and Qian (2010: 48). 
Malaysia: Malaysia Salary, http://www1.malaysiasalary.com/salary/salary-calculation-for-
2012-in-malaysia.html  
South Africa: Tax Pocket Guide 2012, 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2012/sars/Budget%202012%20Po
cket%20Guide.pdf 
South Korea: National Tax Service, Korea, 2012 Automatic Calculation, 
http://www.nts.go.kr/eng/help/help_53_2012.asp?top_code=H001&sub_code=HS05&ssub_c
ode=HSE3 
 
Appendix 2: Regressions for imputing top 1% income shares 
 
In Anand and Segal (2015) we regressed the top 1% income share (WTID data) on the top 
10% share from household survey data and on mean survey income, replicated in column (5) 
of table A2. Here we use additional covariates, with the results in table A2. For countries 
with no top income data we use the regression in column (6).36 For countries that do have top 
income data, most have it for only a subset of the benchmark years; for the missing years for 
                                               
36 The following are not shown in table A2: Age dependency ratios were insignificant, as were dummies for all 
regions except Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). A small number of country-years without top income 
data also lack data on government share of GDP. For these countries we impute using regression (6) excluding 
the government share variable. We test for the effect of outliers by running a robust regression of column (6) in 
Stata, which iteratively excludes outliers. All coefficients keep the same signs and remain significant at 1%. 
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these countries we provide improved estimates by using the fixed-effects regression in 
column (7). In the fixed effects regression meaninc is highly insignificant (not shown) so we 
drop it. Topten is significant at the 12% level and improves the R2 so we retain it. 
 
Table A2: Regressions of top 1% share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
Topten 0.3443***    0.4087*** 0.2650*** 0.08520 
 (0.03423)    (0.0370) (0.03775) (0.05322) 
Meaninc  -0.05852 -0.7543***  0.1384*** 0.1649***  
  (0.04647) (0.1602)  (0.0377) (0.03505)  
Meaninc2   0.03013***     
   (0.006678)     
Gov    -0.2822***  -0.2363*** -0.2500*** 
    (0.05957)  (0.04323) (0.08758) 
LAC      4.647***  
      (1.001)  
year      0.09327*** 0.1483*** 
      (0.02626) (0.01782) 
constant 0.3969 10.40  14.66 -3.157 -182.1 -284.6 
        
R2 0.4454 0.0124 0.1507 0.1512 0.4993 0.6563 0.4334 
Notes: All regressions have 128 observations across 28 countries. Topten is top decile share 
from survey data. Meaninc is mean survey income in thousands of constant PPP$. Gov is 
government expenditure as a share of GDP. LAC is a dummy for Latin American and the 
Caribbean.  Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Our purpose is imputation rather than causal analysis, but we make brief remarks on the 
results of these regressions. The top decile share (from surveys) is positive and highly 
significant in all these regressions. This is not surprising, since it means that more inequality 
on one measure (the top decile share) is associated with more inequality on another measure 
(the top percentile share). Mean income (from surveys) has no significant simple correlation 
with the top percentile share (column 2), but when we add its square both regressors are 
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highly significant (column 3), indicating a U-shape. Once we include other covariates 
meaninc is highly significant, and positive, but meaninc squared loses significance (not 
shown). On the other hand, the top 10% share from surveys is negatively associated with 
mean income: a regression of topten on meaninc produces a negative and highly significant 
(p=0.000) coefficient (not shown). One purely statistical explanation could be that the very 
rich find it easier to avoid taxes in poorer countries, which have weaker enforcement 
capacity, leading to greater underestimation of the top 1% share in poorer countries. This 
would imply an upward bias in the coefficient relating the top 1% share and mean income, 
and would not affect the survey-based estimate of the top 10% share. On the other hand, the 
hypothesis that mean income levels are causally associated with inequality has a long 
pedigree. Kuznets (1955) famously described a variety of possible mechanisms, both positive 
and negative, and postulated an inverse-U relationship between inequality and income – the 
opposite of the U-shape we find for the top 1% share. Determining which mechanism is at 
work is beyond the scope of this paper, but some association would not be surprising. 
 
Two possible explanations for the negative coefficient on government expenditure as a share 
of GDP are as follows. First, countries with larger governments tend to have more 
redistribution, and may therefore also be countries with more egalitarian norms and less 
social acceptance of excessive pay at the top of the distribution. Second, larger governments 
are associated with higher marginal tax rates for the rich, and Piketty (2014) argues that these 
reduce the incentive for highly paid individuals to further bargain up their pre-tax incomes. 
The LAC dummy is positive and significant. This region is well known to have high levels of 
inequality, and this finding tells us that top 1% shares are higher even when controlling for 
top 10% shares. That is, inequality is unusually high within the top 10%, and not just between 
the top 10% and lower income groups. 
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Appendix 3: Regional classifications   
 
ADV is the IMF classification Advanced Economies, composed of 37 countries: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Province of 
China, United Kingdom, and United States.   
 
EURDEV is the IMF classification Emerging and Developing Europe, composed of 13 
countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo, FYR 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey.   
 
CIS is IMF classification Commonwealth of Independent States, composed of 12 countries: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Georgia, which is not a member of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, is included in this group for reasons of geography and 
similarities in economic structure.    
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